

International trade and macro:
Trade policy uncertainty

Policy uncertainty


- ▶ Policy uncertainty is everywhere
 - ▶ Will we be wearing masks next month?
 - ▶ What will the corporate tax be in 5 years?
 - ▶ Will Madison metro build a Bus Rapid Transit line?
 - ▶ Will the Fed raise the FFR?

- ▶ Trade policy has some unique features that makes it great to study.
Two examples:
 1. WTO tariff bindings
 2. China-U.S. (pre-2018) tariff policy

WTO tariff bindings


- ▶ Under WTO rules, bargain over a bound tariff: $\bar{\tau}_{gjt}$
 - ▶ Tariff cannot exceed this rate; can be below
 - ▶ Many countries have goods with tariffs below bound rate
 - ▶ The *binding gap* is $\bar{\tau}_{gjt} - \tau_{gjt}$
- ▶ The gap tells us how much worse it could get for an exporter
- ▶ When there are sunk costs of exporting, uncertainty over a *binding reversal* creates an option value to delay exporting
 - ▶ This is an extensive margin effect
 - ▶ Future tariffs, not current are important here
- ▶ There is some confusion about language in this literature. The “uncertainty” they are talking about is not a mean preserving spread. There are first-moment differences, too.

Handley (2014): Australia



Notes: Change in log points from the MFN tariff to the bound tariff in 2001.
 $100 \times \ln(B_v/\tau_v)$ where $B, \tau = (1 + \text{ad-valorem rate})$.

Handley (2014): Australia



Handley (2014): Australia

$$I_{gjt} = \alpha_{jt} + \alpha_{gj} + \beta_0 \log(\bar{\tau}_{gjt}/\tau_{gjt}) + \beta_1 \log(\tau_{gjt}) + \epsilon_{gjt}$$

- I_{gjt} indicator function of exports of g from j

Dependent variable: product traded (binary)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Binding gap (ln)	-0.0804*** [0.00819]	-0.0915*** [0.00888]	
Applied tariff (ln)	-0.135*** [0.0101]	-0.164*** [0.0126]	-0.0942*** [0.0107]
Preference margin		0.143*** [0.0289]	0.0371 [0.0267]
Observations	3,770,862	3,770,862	3,770,862
R-squared	0.796	0.796	0.796

Notes: All columns include exporter-year and exporter-product fixed effects. Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered by product-year.

China-U.S.

- ▶ 1980: U.S. grants China normal trade relations (NTR), big tariff cut
- ▶ 1980-1989: NTR needs to be renewed by President
- ▶ 1990-2001: NTR needs to also be renewed by Congress
 - ▶ Perceived as increase in uncertainty...
 - ▶ ...but always renewed
- ▶ 2001: China joins WTO, gains permanent NTR status
- ▶ Chinese imports to U.S. grow after 2001, even though tariffs **do not** change
- ▶ *NTR gap* is the difference between the NTR tariffs and the fall back “column 2” tariffs

Pierce and Schott (2016): US tariffs on China




FIGURE 2. DISTRIBUTION OF NTR GAPS ACROSS CONSTANT MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES, 1999

Pierce and Schott (2016): US tariffs on China

- ▶ WTO accession → more imports to US → lower US employment
- ▶ Should matter more in goods with more uncertainty (large NTR gap)
- ▶ DiD: before after PNTR, across industries with different gaps

$$\log(e_{it}) = \theta \text{PostPNTR}_t \times \text{NTRGap}_i + \text{PostPNTR}_t \times X_i' \gamma + X_{it}' \lambda + \delta_t + \delta_i + \alpha + \epsilon_{it}$$

Pierce and Schott (2016): US tariffs on China

	$\ln(\text{Emp}_{it})$	$\ln(\text{Emp}_{it})$	$\ln(\text{Emp}_{it})$
Post \times NTR Gap _{<i>i</i>}	-0.714 (0.193)	-0.601 (0.191)	-0.469 (0.147)
Post \times $\ln(\text{K}/\text{Emp}_{i,1990})$		0.037 (0.031)	-0.016 (0.025)
Post \times $\ln(\text{NP}/\text{Emp}_{i,1990})$		0.081 (0.054)	0.132 (0.053)
Post \times Contract Intensity _{<i>i</i>}			-0.181 (0.112)
Post \times Δ China Import Tariffs _{<i>i</i>}			-0.244 (0.140)
Post \times Δ China Subsidies _{<i>i</i>}			0.063 (0.088)
Post \times Δ China Licensing _{<i>i</i>}			-0.238 (0.164)
Post \times 1{Advanced Technology _{<i>i</i>} }			-0.036 (0.045)
MFA Exposure _{<i>it</i>}			-0.342 (0.060)
NTR _{<i>it</i>}			-0.455 (0.670)
US Union Membership _{<i>it</i>}			-0.123 (0.203)
Observations	5,700	5,700	5,700
R^2	0.98	0.98	0.99
Fixed effects	<i>i,t</i>	<i>i,t</i>	<i>i,t</i>
Employment weighted	Yes	Yes	Yes
Implied impact of PNTR	-0.229	-0.193	-0.151

Alessandria et al. (2019)


- ▶ Same U.S.-China uncertainty, but take advantage of the within-year dynamics
 - ▶ Congress votes between July and September to renew NTR status
- ▶ How do imports change in the months before, during after?
 - ▶ Consider a model with storable goods and costs of ordering
 - ▶ Firms hold inventories to minimize ordering costs
 - ▶ Uncertainty can lead to stockpiling of goods

- ▶ More DiD...

$$\begin{aligned}\log(v_{m-2:m}^{ijzt}/v_{m-7:m-5}^{ijzt}) &= \sum_{m'} \beta_{m'}^{TPU} I_{i=US,j=CHN} I_{m=m'} X_{zt} \\ &+ \sum_{m'} \beta_{m'} I_{m=m'} X_{zt} \\ &+ \gamma_{itm} + \gamma_{jtm} + \gamma_{sm} + \epsilon_{ijztm}\end{aligned}$$


- ▶ The growth rate looks at 3-month groups to smooth noise
- ▶ $\beta_{m'}^{TPU}$ measures the response to uncertainty (X_{zt} is NTR gap)
- ▶ Fixed effects to control for product, importer, and exporter seasonality

Alessandria, Khederlarian, and Khan (2019)



Alessandria, Khederlarian, and Khan (2019)

- ▶ This should matter more for goods that are easier to store




Magnitude: Certain vs Uncertain Changes

- ▶ Median uncertain tariff increase, 31% relative to monthly average
 - ▶ Before uncertainty resolution, imports rise 10% (anticipatory elasticity = 0.35)
 - ▶ After resolution imports fall 5% (resolution elasticity = -0.2)
- ▶ Median certain tariff cut of 2% from NAFTA's phase-outs (Khan and Khederlarian, [2019](#))
 - ▶ Before resolution, imports fall 10% (anticipatory elasticity = 5)
 - ▶ After resolution imports rise 15% (resolution elasticity = - 7.5)


Quantification

- ▶ Using a model to estimate the probability of losing NTR
- ▶ The higher the probability of losing NTR, more incentive to stock up
- ▶ Will study the model in detail in a few weeks
 - ▶ Storeable good
 - ▶ Fixed cost of ordering
 - ▶ Firm faces a potential increase in tariffs, with varying probability
- ▶ Find the probability that gets the change in imports in the model closest to the data

Alessandria, Khederlarian, and Khan (2019)



Annual probability of maintaining NTR



Interesting stuff!

- ▶ We learn a lot from these unique tariff uncertainty episodes
- ▶ Are there more examples that can be used?
- ▶ Are their examples like this in other kinds of policy?
 - ▶ Debt ceiling negotiations?
 - ▶ Sunset clauses in antidumping duties?

- ▶ There is always a caveat. . .
 - ▶ NTR gap is correlated with the original liberalization in 1980
 - ▶ Explore this in Alessandria et al. ([2021](#))

References |

- Alessandria, George, Shafaat Y. Khan, and Armen Khederlarian (2019). "Taking stock of trade policy uncertainty: Evidence from China's pre-WTO accession." Unpublished manuscript.
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- Pierce, Justin R. and Peter K. Schott (2016). "The Surprisingly Swift Decline of US Manufacturing Employment." *American Economic Review* 106 (7), pp. 1632–62.