Trade policy uncertainty and exports: Evidence from China's WTO accession


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Question & Stylized facts

● Question: How the reduction in future trade policy uncertainty affects firms' export decisions → China's firms' export to the US (2000-2006), China's WTO accession (2001)

Different firms' ownership Two stylized facts **Aggregate reallocation** (export dynamics in China) **State-Owned Enterprises** Foreign-Invested Enterprises Domestic Private Firms Panel A: Market share changes 2000-2006, overall and by firm ownership Margin SOE FIE DOM All (1) (2)(3)(4)Incumbents net entry -10.484***-5.484***-4.663***-0.336***-75.995***Four margins (2) Exiters -52.107***-19.761***-4.127***of adjustment (3) New exporters 67.144*** 9.906*** 26.836*** 30.402*** New entrants 19.335*** 11.468*** 5.989*** 1.879*** (4) Adders 10.484*** (5) Total net entry -30.734***13.064*** 28.154*** -36.218***8.401*** 27.817*** (6) Total

Trade policy uncertainty



Worst-case tariffs $\downarrow \rightarrow$ Trade policy uncertainty \downarrow


- Before: US special rate of duty
- After: much lower WTO-bound tariffs

Methodology: Theoretical Model

- Incorporate trade policy uncertainty into Melitz(2003) → heterogeneous firm model
- **Basic setting**: (CES + monopolistic competition)
 - CES Preferences: $U = \left[\int_{\omega \in \Omega} q(\omega)^{\frac{\sigma 1}{\sigma}} d\omega \right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma 1}}$, where $\sigma < 1$
 - Demand for each variety ω : $q(\omega) = Q[\frac{p(\omega)}{P}]^{-\sigma}$, where $P = [\int_{\omega \in \Omega} p(\omega)^{1-\sigma} d\omega]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}$ is the aggregate price, Q is the total quantity demanded in this industry
- Trade policy and uncertainty: $\tau > 1$; arrival rate(λ); new tariff ~ H(τ) with support [1, $\bar{\tau}$] where $\bar{\tau} \geq \tau$
- Firm decisions:
 - Sunk entry cost f_e
 - Productivity φ with CDF $G(\varphi)$ and PDF $g(\varphi)$
 - For exporters: **per-period fixed export cost** $M^{\eta}f$, where M is total mass of exporters, $\eta \geq 0$ represents the degree of **congestion externalities** involved in entering export markets
- Firm's export participation (Based on present value of variable profit and the fixed cost)
 - $v_p(\tau_t, \varphi) = v(\tau_t, \varphi) + \rho((1 \lambda)v_p(\tau_t, \varphi) + \lambda E_\tau v_p(\tau_{t+1}, \varphi)) \rightarrow v_p(\tau_t, \varphi) = BRT_t \varphi^{\sigma 1}$ where $B = \frac{1}{M\sigma(1 \rho)\widetilde{\varphi}^{\sigma 1}}$, and $T_t = \delta_a \tau_t^{-1} + \delta_E E_\tau(\tau^{-1})$, $\delta_a = \frac{1 \rho}{1 p(1 \lambda)}$, $\delta_E = \frac{\rho\lambda}{1 p(1 \lambda)}$, $\delta_a + \delta_E = 1$
 - Expected profit: $\pi_p(\tau_t, \varphi) = BRT_t \varphi^{\sigma-1} M^{\eta} f/(1-p) \rightarrow \text{Cutoff productivity } \varphi^*: \pi_p(\tau_t, \varphi^*) = 0$
 - $\varphi \ge \varphi^*$: export
- Conclusion: Trade policy uncertainty $\downarrow \rightarrow \varphi^* \uparrow$, $M \uparrow \rightarrow$ simultaneous entries and exits

Methodology: Empirical analysis

- Data source: China's transaction-level customs data & WTO Tariff Download Facility (HS06 product level)
- Trade policy environment measure: (control variables)
 - τ_h : average U.S. tariff rate of product h between 2000 and 2002
 - $d\tau_h$ = applied tariff in 2000 applied tariff in 2002
 - gap = worst-case tariff applied tariff $\rightarrow dgap_h$ = gap in 2000 gap in 2002 (positive value \rightarrow less uncertainty)



Methodology: Empirical analysis

- Baseline results: (reallocation)
 - Use China's exports to the EU as control group
 - $dlnNum_{mhct} = \sum_{j=2001}^{2006} \beta_j 1\{j=t\} 1\{c=us\} dgdp_h + \sum_{j=2001}^{2006} \delta_j 1\{j=t\} 1\{c=us\} + \sum_{j=2001}^{2006} \gamma_j 1\{j=t\} 1\{c=us\} X_h + \delta_{ht} + \varepsilon_{hct}$ $dlnNum_{mhct}$: change in the log number of exporting firms in margin m for product h exported to destination c in year t

Trade policy uncertainty and the number of firms, difference in differences estimates: US comparison with the EU as the control group.

Dependent	Log firm number (year t) New entrants (new exporter and adders)				Log firm number at year 2000 exited by year t Exiters			
US * dgap * 2001	0.012***	0.014***	0.013***	0.012***	0.012***	0.014***	0.012***	0.012***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
US * dgap * 2002	0.015***	0.017***	0.015***	0.015***	0.012***	0.014***	0.012***	0.012***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
US * dgap * 2003	0.016***	0.018***	0.016***	0.016***	0.011***	0.013***	0.012***	0.011***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
US * dgap * 2004	0.017***	0.021***	0.019***	0.018***	0.012***	0.014***	0.012***	0.012***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
US * dgap * 2005	0.021***	0.022***	0.020***	0.019***	0.012***	0.014***	0.012***	0.012***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
US * dgap * 2006	0.020***	0.022***	0.019***	0.018***	0.012***	0.014***	0.013***	0.012***
0.1	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	0.244***	0.244***	0.259***	0.264***	0.169***	0.169***	0.180***	0.183***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
HS 6 * year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
US * year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
X in US $*$ year $*$ X								
d au	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
au		Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes
F_asset			Yes	Yes			Yes	Yes
_ IM_share				Yes				Yes
N	278,446	278,446	259,476	254,968	278,446	278,446	259,476	254,968
R^2	0.738	0.738	0.747	0.749	0.724	0.725	0.734	0.736
Adj. R ²	0.738	0.738	0.747	0.749	0.724	0.725	0.734	0.736
F	6138.980*.**	4646.850	4083.272	3520.625	4309.669	3249.056	2689.484	2264.383

Methodology: Empirical analysis

- **Robustness check:** industry-specific/ trade-regime specific/ induced by other possible trade policy uncertainties like AD
- **Uncertainty reductions & More competitive market**
 - Price

$$price_{fhc} = \alpha + \beta_{1}1\{new\}_{fc} + \beta_{2}1\{new\}_{fc}1\{c = us\} + \beta_{3}1\{new\}_{fc}dgap_{h} + \beta_{4}1\{new\}_{fc}1\{c = us\}dgap_{h} + \delta_{hc} + \varepsilon_{hct}$$

Quality

$$U = \left(\int (\eta q)^{\frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma}} d\omega\right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1}}, \text{ where } \eta \text{ is the quality of the variety}$$

$$\Rightarrow \text{ Demand: } q = \eta^{\sigma - 1} p^{-\sigma} P^{\sigma - 1} Y \Rightarrow lnq = -\sigma lnp + \ln(P^{\sigma - 1} Y) + (\sigma - 1) ln\eta$$

- \rightarrow Regression: $lnq_{fht} = -\sigma lnp_{fht} + a_{ht} + u_{fht} \rightarrow$ Use estimated residual $\eta_{fht} = e^{\hat{u}_{fht}/(\sigma-1)}$ to represent quality
- → Use quality as dependent variable to regress again as in price

Price and quality difference between new exporters and exiters.

Dependent	Price in year t (for	new exporters) or in yea	r 2000 (for exiters)	Quality in year t (for new exporters) or in year 2000 (for exiters)			
	t = 2002	t = 2004	t = 2006	t = 2002	t = 2004	t = 2006	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
New	-11.083	1.095	5.549	0.955***	0.261	0.972***	
	(70.740)	(41.401)	(28.853)	(0.207)	(0.161)	(0.143)	
New * US	138.291	154.868**	130.370***	-0.284	-0.109	-0.697	
	(103.393)	(61.549)	(42.976)	(0.303)	(0.239)	(0.213)	
New * dgap	0.246	-0.248	-0.302	-0.011**	0.004	0.002	
	(1.540)	(0.888)	(0.611)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	
New * US * dgap	-4.187^*	-4.836^{***}	-4.080^{***}	0.009	0.003	0.013***	
	(2.308)	(1.374)	(0.955)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)	
Constant	28.624	34.185**	32.229***	50.773***	50.674***	50.154***	
	(27.928)	(16.571)	(11.667)	(0.082)	(0.064)	(0.058)	
Prod * Cty FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
N	260,387	441,467	732,152	260,387	441,467	732,152	
R^2	0.059	0.021	0.014	0.166	0.158	0.154	
Adj. R^2	0.037	0.008	0.006	0.147	0.147	0.147	
F	2.028	6.259	8.880	90.863	297.128	675.937	

Conclusion & Future studies

- Conclusion
 - Reallocation effect: simultaneous entries and exits
 - More competitive market: lower prices & improved productivity

Future studies

- other firm-level characteristics
- multi-product firms' responses